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The European Union and the United States operate different variants of market capitalism. The EU
model uses social dialogue institutions to help determine economic outcomes, particularly in the
labor market, whereas the US relies more on market forces. The theory of competitive markets
provides a powerful framework for analyzing market driven economies and for assessing the
conditions under which unfettered markets yield desirable outcomes. But there is no comparable
framework for analyzing institution driven economies. This paper argues that models of efficient
bargaining/the Coase Theorem offer the best framework for analyzing social dialogue economies and
for identifying policies and institutional reforms to improve their functioning.
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  “Collective bargaining and social dialogue were designed into the European 
project from the very beginning.”  John Monks, European Trade Unions Congress 
Secretary, May 2004  
 
  The European Union and the United States operate different variants of market 
capitalism.  Both systems base economic transactions on private property and rule of law.  
Both have open economies with sound monetary and macro-economic policies.  Where 
the EU and US differ is in the role of institutions in affecting outcomes, particularly in 
the labor market.   
  The EU relies on collective bargaining between employer associations and trade 
unions to determine wages and employment and on social dialogue between the “social 
partners” of  labor and capital, often working in concert with government, to choose 
social and economic policies. The US relies on firms and individual workers to determine 
employment and wages in competitive markets.  The EU has high taxes that provide a 
strong social safety net for workers.  The US has lower taxes and a weak safety net for 
workers.  The differences are sufficiently large to have generated a “war of the models” 
about how best to organize a market economy (Freeman, 1998). 
  From the 1960s through the 1970s oil shock and productivity slowdown, the rapid 
growth and low unemployment of Western European economies led some analysts to 
generalize that neo-corporatist centralized bargaining wage systems work better than 
more market based systems  (Bruno and Sachs, 1984).  In the 1980s Japan’s rapid 
economic growth and export success directed attention at the virtues of Japanese 
institutions.  During his visit to Harvard in 1986/7 Enzio Tarantelli and I debated whether 
the Japanese economy was more aligned to the EU institution-affected system than to   4 
more market-driven US.
1  But Japan went into a bad economic decade while US 
performance improved.  From the 1990s through the mid 2000s, the rapid growth and low 
unemployment in the US shifted sentiment in favor of more market driven variants of 
capitalist economies.
2  
  Regardless of whether more market-driven or institution influenced economies do 
better in a given period of time, there is generally a wide range of economic outcomes 
within each group.  In the 1990s the US performed well in productivity and employment 
but Canada, with much the same economic system, had an horrific economic record.  
From the 1990s through the mid 2000s several smaller EU economies --Ireland, 
Denmark, Austria, and to some extent the Netherlands -- performed better than Germany 
and France, among others.  Supporters of the EU system often cite the smaller successes 
as evidence that social dialogue economies can deliver economic efficiency as well as 
economic security and desirable distributions of income.  
  When market economies run into trouble, the natural response of economists has 
traditionally been to seek out imperfections in the market and to suggest ways to 
eliminate those imperfections.  This response builds on the powerful framework that 
economic theory provides for analyzing real market economies.  The model of a perfectly 
functioning competitive system gives economists and policy-makers a benchmark for 
measuring real world divergences from the ideal and directs attention at reforms designed 
to bring the real world closer to the competitive ideal.  
                                                 
1  The modest unionization rates, company level unions, use of bonuses related to profits, and 
limited political role of unions suggested that Japan was closer to the US than to the EU system.  
But the Shunto offensive, coordination of wage settlements, lifetime employment, lead bank 
system, industrial concentration, and protection of small firms in the service sector suggested 
that Japan was closer to the EU than to the US.   
2 For instance, in 2004, 4.9% of the German labor force had been unemployed for over a year,   5 
  When EU economies have gotten into trouble, the economists’ response is often 
the same: to identify market imperfections and seek ways to eliminate them.  But this 
seems less appropriate in a social dialogue economy than in a market-dominated 
economy.  Why not seek out imperfections in the social dialogue institutions and search 
for ways to improve institutional interventions?  One reason why economists do not 
pursue this approach is that we lack a well-specified model of the ideal institution driven 
economy to benchmark real world divergences from the ideal.  
  In the world of ideas and in policy discourse the absence of a social dialogue 
model creates an uneven playing field for assessing the two capitalist models and 
improving their performances.  
   EU social dialogue model, where art thou? 
  This paper begins the search for such a model.  Section I documents the 
differences between the EU’s social dialogue and collective bargaining system and the 
US’s market driven economy.  Section II presents my principal theme: that efficient 
bargaining models and the Coase theorem offer the best framework for developing the 
missing social dialogue model.  Section III assesses evidence on efficient bargaining 
from laboratory experiments.  Section IV considers the implications from game theory 
analyses of bargaining for developing an efficient social dialogue system.  There is a 
short conclusion. 
I The Two Economic Systems 
  Exhibit 1 gives a capsule summary of the differences between the EU and US 
economic systems.  The exhibit shows that the EU relies on collective bargaining to set 
                                                                                                                                                 
compared to 0.7% of the US labor force. OECD, Employment Outlook, 2005, table A and G   6 
wages and working conditions to a far greater extent than does the US.  In the EU 77 
percent of workers
3 were covered by agreements in 2000, many through mandatory 
extension of contracts to firms outside the bargaining group. In the US bargaining covers 
only 13 percent of workers, and most collective bargaining contracts are at the firm level.  
Although EU centralized bargaining allows for “wages drift” (by which firms deviate 
from the agreement due to their particular circumstances), and although most EU 
countries have devolved some bargaining to firms or plants, the difference in reliance on 
institutions in wage-setting with the US remains stark.  The 2003 Global Competitiveness 
Report gave  the US the 3
rd highest rank in terms of having wages set by the company vs 
by institutions and while the median ranking for EU countries was 68 out of 80 countries 
in the listing (World Economic Forum, 2003, table 10.19). 
  The US and EU also differ greatly in the rules that govern “ownership” of jobs.  
The US has employment at will, which allows firms to lay off or fire workers at their 
discretion with no legally mandated severance pay.  During a strike, the employer can 
replace strikers and need not re-employ them after the dispute.  By contrast, EU  
employment protection legislation gives some ownership of jobs to workers. The 
OECD’s index of employment protection legislation, which gives higher scores to 
countries with greater protection, gave the US a score of  0.7 compared to a score of 2.3 
for EU countries in 2003.
4 Strikers in the EU have a right to return to their job after a 
labor dispute. 
                                                 
3OECD, Employment Outlook 2004, table 3.3, where I have averaged  collective bargaining 
coverage figures for 2000 for 13 EU countries and Norway, excluding the new East European 
members.  
4  OECD, Employment Outlook 2004, table 2.A2.3, where I averaged the EPL scores for the EU countries 
and Norway, exclusive of the new entrants.    7 
  In the product market the US has fewer regulations governing business activity 
and makes it easier to form and end businesses than the EU.  It takes 64 days to form a 
business in the EU compared to 7 days in the US.  The OECD index of regulations, 
which codes countries from 0 to 2 in three different areas of regulations, gave the US in 
2003 a 1 in product market regulations, 1.1 in administrative regulations, and 1.3 in 
economic regulations compared to 1.4, 1.5, and 2.0 in these three areas for the EU.
5   
  Finally, the US has a more limited welfare state than EU countries. In the US the 
primary source of economic security is working; unemployment benefits are modest and 
of limited duration; and income support for single parent families is limited.  The US 
offers health care insurance through employers or private purchase; government 
provision is limited to the elderly and poor.  While state and local governments funds 
primary and secondary education, a large proportion of higher education is paid by 
students and their families and by private donations.  
   By contrast, the welfare state is the EU’s primary source of economic security. 
All EU countries offer high replacement rates for unemployed persons for long periods.  
All have some form of national health insurance. Many provide housing assistance for 
workers who lose their job and offer other benefits so that loss of a job does not devastate 
their living standards.  In addition to providing free primary and secondary education, the 
EU provides low tuition higher education through state support of universities.   
  To fund the wider role of government in 2004 governments in the EU received 
48% of GDP compared to the US government receipts of 32% of GDP
6. 
Social dialogue vs market lobbying 
                                                 
5  Djankov, et al, 2000; Conway, et al, table 24   8 
   The EU uses social dialogue institutions to bring the voices of business and 
labor into social and economic policy-making.  Most EU countries encourage dialogue at 
workplaces through mandated works councils. Depending on the country, from 25% to 
50% of workers are represented by elected works councils, and almost all workers in 
middle to large establishments have the option to establish a council at their workplace.  
The EU social charter requires EU-level councils for larger firms. 
  By contrast, US labor law discourages firms from setting up systems of dialogue 
with workers outside of collective bargaining.  Section 8a of the US’s Labor-
Management Relations Act forbids firms from establishing non-union systems of 
collective representation for fear that companies will create company-dominated 
organizations to avoid genuine worker organizations.  Many firms have employee 
involvement committees but these committees are legally allowed to deal only with 
issues that concern the firm such as productivity rather than with worker concerns such as 
pay, benefits or working conditions.  
  At the national level, the EU relies on social dialogue committees to ascertain the 
views of labor and management on diverse issues.  The US relies on a very different 
mechanism for interest groups to contribute to national policy-making – lobbying in 
which the groups that fund political campaigns meet with legislators to argue for their 
views. 
  Exhibit 2 contrasts the EU social dialogue system with the US lobbying system. 
The upper panel gives the EU’s own description of its system, as reported at the 2005 EU 
social dialogue summit. While the description focuses on dialogue at the EU level, it 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 US Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract 2006, table 1335.   9 
notes that “ the European social dialogue complements the national practices of social 
dialogue, which exist in most Member States”.  Indeed, it is at the national level where 
social partnership arrangements are particularly important and where collective 
bargaining occurs. When an EU government deviates from the consultative model, as the 
De Villepin government did in France in 2006 when it enacted a new youth labor law 
without consultation, it risks enraging the groups that were not consulted – in this case, 
students and unions, whose protests forced the government to withdraw the law.  
   The lower panel describes the US lobbying system. It is a market-based system 
built on the US mode of funding political campaigns through private contributions. 
Lobbyists buy access to candidates through their contributions and use that access to 
present their case for/against legislation in private closed-door meetings.  The opinion 
polls summarized in the exhibit show that in the 1990s-2000s the most Americans 
believed that political lobbyists had too much power and bribed members of Congress 
regularly, and that as a result most citizens were concerned about the corruption this 
engendered in Washington. 
  There is an extensive social science literature on lobbying activities and on the 
impact of campaign contributions on legislator’s decision, but no comparable analysis of 
the operation of social dialogue committees.   
   EU social dialogue model, where art thou? 
II. The Social Dialogue Model and Efficient Bargaining 
  The main theme of this paper is that the theory of efficient bargaining and Coase 
Theorem provide the best framework for answering the “where art thou?” question. 
  The notion of efficient bargaining has a distinguished pedigree in economics.   In   10 
chapter 7 of the Theory of Wages (first edition, 1932), John Hicks argued that 
collective bargaining should produce agreement rather than impasse in most situations.  
After all, most strikes lower the joint output of capital and labor and thus make no 
rational sense. He asserted that “the majority of actual strikes are doubtless the result of 
faulty negotiation” (Hicks, 146).  Efficient bargaining between employers and unions 
ought to yield the same patterns of outcomes that the efficient market hypothesis predicts 
for financial markets: randomness.  Labor specialists should be no more able to predict 
strikes from public information than financial specialists can predict financial returns 
from such information.  
   In 1946 Wassily Leontief applied the efficient bargaining model to the 
“guaranteed annual wage” that the US United Automobile Workers negotiated with 
General Motors.  In this contract the Automobile Workers insisted that GM pay for at 
least a minimal number of hours of work from the existing work force.  Leontief 
interpreted this as bargaining over employment as well as wages and pointed out that 
through such a strategy the union could shift distribution to labor while maintaining the 
presumably efficient pre-union wage employment and output.   
  In 1986 Mancur Olson argued that “all-encompassing” unions – those that 
represent all workers – should internalize the externalities associated with inefficient 
bargains and produce more efficient outcomes than unions that represent only some 
workers in a country.  In 1988 Lars Calmfors and John Driffill further developed the 
notion that centralized or coordinated bargaining yields outcomes comparable to 
competitive markets while industry level bargaining yields less efficient outcomes.   
  But the most influential analysis of efficient bargaining lies outside of labor   11 
economics.  This is the Coase theorem on property rights and externalities, which has 
generated a huge literature in law and economics (Coase, 1960).  The theorem holds that, 
absent transactions costs, the clear allocation  property rights/decision-making power 
suffices to assure efficient outcomes.  The reason is that, regardless of who owns what, 
economic agents should bargain to the most efficient point of production and then divide 
the maximum output.  They ought to leave no money on the table.  The prediction that 
efficiency depends solely on clear property rights suggests that economies with 
egalitarian rules governing distribution can be as efficient with more unequal income 
distributions.
7   
But real world bargaining is not efficient  
  “Using the Coase theorem as the starting point for the analysis of EU economies 
is more Chicago than Chicago.  Bargainers often do not reach efficient solutions.”  (Ed 
Lazear, commenting on the theme of this essay) 
 
  The criticism is right. There are many cases of real world bargaining that falls 
short of efficient agreements.  In labor economics, the most widely studied failure of 
efficient bargaining is in strike behavior.  In contrast to Hicks’ prediction that strikes 
should have no predictable pattern across time or space, strikes are pro-cyclical, occur 
frequently in some sectors and firms and not in others, are more common in some 
countries than in others, and occur in narrow time periods.  Striking is less common in 
sectors where the costs to labor and capital are largest but occurs sometimes even when 
both sides end up as big losers.  Game theory, models of asymmetric information, 
detailed models of negotiations – whatever economists have thrown at the problem – 
                                                 
7 Medema and Zerbe (1999, p 838)  note that some versions of the Coase theorem add a stronger claim: that 
the final allocation of resources will itself be invariant to the assignment of property rights.  Since the 
redistributions associated with social dialogue economies are highly likely to affect the allocation of   12 
have failed to put a rational efficient market interpretation onto the strike data.   
  Labor economists have also examined the prediction that efficient union-
management negotiations should alter pay but maintain employment and output.  Given 
that most collective contracts have some form of “management rights” clause that 
reserves control over hiring to the firm, the claim that the union determines employment 
seems on the face of it unrealistic.  In the few cases where unions have negotiated 
employment as well as pay, the outcome has often been featherbedding rather than 
efficient work arrangements (for example, musicians sitting in a studio with recorded 
music in the early days of radio).  Since US unions raise compensation and unionized 
firms/sectors/workplaces tend to have lower employment growth than their non-union 
counterparts, most economists reject the notion that collective bargaining produces 
employment off the demand curve in an efficient way.  
  In a similar vein, studies of productivity among sectors and firms find that 
competitive pressures can induce producers to raise productivity so greatly that they 
almost certainly had previously unexploited opportunities to increase efficiency – what 
Leibenstein (1966) called X-efficiency.  Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz (2002) have 
documented a particularly striking example of this in the recovery of US and Canadian  
iron ore producers from the collapse of steel production in their home markets in the 
1980s.  The iron ore producers raised their productivity massively compared to otherwise 
comparable iron ore producers operating in markets that had little or no increase in 
competitive pressures.  The intensified competitive pressure led the firms to reform work 
and staffing rules that they could readily have done before they faced great competitive 
                                                                                                                                                 
resources as well as the distribution, I deal solely with the efficiency proposition.   13 
pressures. 
Empirical studies of the Coase Theorem   
  Law and economics analyses of the Coase theorem in diverse other settings also 
give a mixed picture of its real world applicability. Steven Medema and Richard Zerbe 
(1999) reviewed studies of the effect on agricultural production of the property right to 
control animal trespassing on farmlands.  Two studies found efficient outcomes but both 
attributed the outcomes to social pressures/norms to keep animals off farm lands rather 
than to efficient bargaining between farmers and ranchers.  The third study rejected the 
efficiency outcome.   In 1989 John Donohue examined the 1980s Illinois employment 
experiment, which paid bonuses to workers or to firms to encourage the unemployed to 
find employment quickly from the perspective of the theorem. One variant of the 
experiment paid the bonuses to unemployed workers who found a new job quickly.  
Another variant paid the bonuses to the firms for hiring unemployed workers quickly.  
The Coase Theorem predicts that the property right to the bonus ought not affect the 
employment outcome.  But the payments to workers led to greater employment and 
bonus receipt than did the payments to firms. Whether the Coase theorem failed because 
transactions costs were higher than the experiment envisaged as some critics of 
Donohue’s work argued (see Medema and Zerba, 869-871), or because of some other 
form of non-optimizing behavior, the important conclusion is that in this real world 
example, the allocation of property rights affected efficiency.  
  Studies of divorce laws, where the state changes the law from requiring both sides 
to agree to a divorce (so that the side most eager for the divorce would pay more to the 
other side to accept it) to allowing one side to insist upon the divorce, have also found the   14 
Coase Theorem wanting.  Peters (1992) reported that changes in divorce laws from 
mutual to unilateral divorce had effects consistent with the theorem: a change in the 
division of family assets but no change in the frequency of divorce. But ensuing work, 
summarized in Allen (2006), has found that rates of divorce rise when the law moves 
from mutual divorce to unilateral divorce, contrary to efficient bargaining. Wolfers’ 
(2006) analysis offers further evidence and analysis of the problems with the Coase 
Theorem in this setting.  
  The most widely studied Coase theorem prediction relevant to EU labor problems 
relates to employment protection laws (EPL). The Coase theorem predicts that EPL will 
not affect aggregate outcomes but will alter the distribution of income.  Many policy 
analysts dismiss the prediction and argue that weaker EPL laws would reduce 
unemployment, but empirical analyses find no such consistent effect.  The OECD (2004) 
review of studies of EPL concluded that “the numerous empirical studies of this issue 
lead to conflicting results, and (notes further that) moreover their robustness has been 
questioned.” Baker et al’s (2005) analysis showing that empirical results vary greatly 
with modest variation in the models, countries, time period, and measures used to assess 
the impact of EPL is more consistent with EPL having no effect on the volume of 
employment or unemployment than with the belief that it has effects.    
  This does not mean the EPL does not impact labor market outcomes.  Stronger 
EPL regulations are associated with lower flows of labor from employment into 
unemployment, which benefits older workers, and with lower flows from unemployment 
to employment, which generally harms younger workers and other new entrants to the job 
market (OECD, 2004).  What is important is that the effects are on the distribution of   15 
employment rather or more than on the volume of employment or unemployment, 
consistent with the Coase theorem. 
  Still, the EPL studies aside, the bulk of empirical work in labor and in law and 
economics indicates that the efficient bargaining model does not fit reality well. Does this 
make Coase theorem style thinking irrelevant for assessing social dialogue economic 
systems?  
  I think not.  Empirical analyses of market driven economies show that real 
markets often fall short of 100% efficiency, but the competitive model still provides a 
valuable framework for analysing market performance.  In finance the efficient market 
hypothesis is a useful first approximation and benchmark, even though researchers have 
uncovered numerous empirical regularities that reject the model. By analogy, the efficient 
bargaining/Coase theorem model can still be a valuable ideal for illuminating social 
dialogue systems even though the world does not evince efficient bargaining as a general 
rule. 
III.  Laboratory experiments and behavioral economics 
  Another way to judge the relevance of efficient bargaining models to real 
situations is through laboratory experiments.  The bulk of experiments in which efficient 
production requires cooperation among people – the prisoner’s dilemma
8; public goods 
games
9–  shows that people attain efficient or near efficient solutions in many cases even 
without formal side agreements.  For example, tit for tat behavior tends to dominate 
                                                 
8 The prisoner’s dilemma is the most widely studied cooperation game.  Efficient production requires that 
the two participants choose to cooperate even though there is an incentive to defect.  See Wikipedia 
9 In public goods games subjects invest  money in a public pot whose value increases, often with higher 
returns the greater the amount invested, and keep the money they did not invest in the pot plus an even 
share of the money in the pot.  See Wikipedia    16 
prisoner’s dilemma games, producing efficient outcomes.  And while participants in 
public goods games rarely contribute 100% to the pot, they almost never contribute the 
0% that theory predicts.  If people approach efficient solutions without side agreements, 
perhaps a modicum of bargaining would bring them even closer.   
  The experiments on the Coase theorem by Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew 
Spitzer highlight the strength and weakness of the theorem.  Their experiments assigned a 
number to each of two participants, one of which could be cashed in for real money.  A 
coin toss gave the property right/power to determine which number gets cashed in to one 
of participants. Without bargaining the person who won the toss would presumably select 
their number for that is the most that they can get.  They should do this even if the second 
party has a larger number, producing a socially inefficient outcome from the perspective 
of the pair. But bargaining ought to yield the efficient outcomes.  The person with the 
power to determine which number cashes in ought to pick the highest number subject to a 
side arrangement in which they obtain more money than they could earn from cashing in 
their own number (arguably, the entire reward less some minimal payment to the second 
party, who would otherwise get nothing).  
  Hoffman and Spitzer found that over 90% of the sets of bargainers brought the 
higher number to the experimenter for an efficient allocation.  But the bargainers 
distributed the rewards in a manner inconsistent with rational bargaining.  They tended to 
divide the money equally even though that meant that the party with the property right 
accepted less than he/she would have gained by selecting their own number!  When 
Hoffman and Spitzer altered the allocation of the property right from a coin flip to the 
winner of a contest and educated the winner about choosing in their own interests, the   17 
majority of pairs chose the joint maximum but only 60% bargained for more than they 
would have gotten by selecting their own number.   
  In sum, these experiments yielded efficient outcomes, but they also found that 
participants got to the efficient outcome through decision processes far from the self-
interested economic rationality that underlie the Coase Theorem. 
  Stewart Schwab’s (1988) experiment used a more complicated bargaining design 
that failed to produce efficient solutions.  In Schwab’s experiment students were divided 
into union and management teams that bargained over 3 items: wages, vacation days -- 
which benefited workers more than they cost management up to15 days but which after 
15 days cost management more than their worth to workers, and a contract clause that 
allowed the firm to move work from the union plant to a non-union plant.  In half of the 
experiments, the work clause produced more value to the management team than to the 
union team.  In the other half, keeping the clause out of the contract meant more to the 
union.  A fully efficient bargain required that the parties agree to 15 days of vacation and 
adopt the transfer clause in the first variant and reject the clause in the second variant.  
The wage ($1 benefit to workers = $1 cost of the firm) gave the parties an easily 
transferable way to redistribute output from the optimal solution.  But Schwab found that  
“neither item was bargained to a fully efficient result”(p 251).  The contracts produced an 
average of 11 days of vacation pay and the optimal solution for the transfer clause in 
2/3rds of the cases.  The bargaining left money on the table. 
  Surprisingly, even though bargainers did not reach optimal efficiency, the 
experiment validated the prediction of the Coase theorem that changes in property rights 
do not affect allocation.  In one variant of the experiment the firm had the initial property   18 
right to transfer the work. In another variant the union had the initial right to forbid the 
transfer.  The two property rights regimes produced contracts with similar outcomes 
(approximately 2/3rds efficient) while giving a greater share of the joint output to the 
party with the property right.  
  Thus, like the “real world” assessments, laboratory experiments give a mixed 
picture of Coase theorem/efficient bargaining. Bargaining pairs sometimes reach 
efficiency and sometimes not.  Distributive outcomes are sometimes consistent with the 
model and sometimes not. These findings raise what is arguably the critical stumbling 
block for the theme of this essay: whether actual behavior diverges so much from rational 
optimizing as to invalidate the use of efficient bargaining/Coase Theorem models as 
benchmarks for analyzing EU social dialogue economies.    
behavioral economics and efficient bargaining 
  A large growing body of evidence from psychology and behavioral economics 
shows that people make decisions in ways that deviate substantially from the rational 
optimization that economists have historically assumed.  Some of these forms of non-
rational optimizing behavior make attainment of efficient outcomes more likely – notably 
the tendencies for cooperation and for fair distribution of outcomes – but others call into 
question the entire notion of efficient bargaining to a social optimum.  
  As an example of the latter, consider  the evidence that possession of a good 
raises a person’s valuation of it – “the endowment effect” on preferences.  The 
endowment effects experiments show that random assignment of items to people (such as 
coffee mugs of a given color) raises their valuation of the item and thus leads them to ask 
for more money to give up the item than they would be willing to pay for it had it not   19 
been in their possession  (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990).  When willingness to 
accept payment diverges from willingness to pay for the same item the volume of trade 
will be below what the Coase theorem would predict for reasons beyond transactions 
costs.  Two economies with different initial distributions of property rights would have 
different social optimum. 
  A second example of behavioral findings that challenge any efficient bargaining 
analysis is the evidence that individuals choose “default” options in savings behavior for 
long periods even when other options dominate the default (Beshears et al, 2006).  Since 
the transaction cost of shifting to a higher return option are nominally modest, the 
implication is that there are large internal transactions costs that deter rational choice.  If 
a person does not efficiently bargain with themself to make the sensible decision, it 
seems unrealistic that they can bargain efficiently with others, per any efficient 
bargaining model. 
  Without gainsaying the importance of these and related findings from behavioral 
economics on how people really make decisions, I reject the strong claim that this 
evidence by itself  invalidates the use of efficient bargaining/Coase Theorem models as 
ideals for social dialogue systems.   
  One reason why the findings do not invalidate the efficient bargaining ideal is that 
markets can be efficient even when bargainers make decisions in ways that diverge 
greatly from economic rationality.  Markets based on “zero intelligence agents” – 
computer code that chooses randomly among options – give efficient or near efficient 
outcomes when the agents face budget constraints and/or operate under exit and entry 
conditions (Gode and Sunder).  The agents that make bad decisions lose their position in   20 
the market over time while those who randomly drew good decisions increase their 
share of the market. In a bargaining situation, the pair of bargainers that reach efficient 
outcomes, even by chance, will expand their market presence, leading to an evolution 
toward efficient outcomes. 
  Another reason is that people may make more rational decisions when they 
represent others in collective bargaining or social dialogue settings than when they act on 
their own behalf.  For instance, I would expect that pension fund managers who may 
follow some low return default in their own savings behavior would search carefully for 
the best returns for the fund as part of their job.  Similarly, someone who might take a 
high risk in a personal investment would choose lower risk options when representing 
widows and pensioners.  Indeed, while society does not care how someone invests their 
own funds, it places “fiduciary responsibility” on those investing on behalf of others, 
which means that they ought to be able to give rational explanations for their decisions.  
If my expectations are correct, some behavioral anomalies in private decision-making 
will not generalize to settings where decisions are part of someone’s social role. 
  Finally, collective bargaining and social dialogue usually involve group decision-
making, which can also produce decisions that differ from what people make on their 
own.  Studies of group judgment show that under some circumstances groups make better 
use of information than individuals.   This is the “wisdom of crowds” that improves 
estimates of parameters and that reduces variation in those estimates (Surowiecki, 2004).  
But other studies show that group decision-making can lead to erroneous decisions, 
which members of the group hold with high confidence (Sunstein).  
  Sunstein gives a telling example of erroneous group decision-making in an   21 
experimental setting.  Participants are asked to estimate whether the experimenter is 
using a Red urn, which has 60% red balls, or a Black urn, which has 60% black balls. The 
experimenter selects balls from the chosen urn and gives one ball to each person.  If each 
person independently guesses the urn from which the experimenter selected the balls, 
they would guess the urn whose color they had drawn; and the group would choose the 
urn with the color of the majority of the balls.  Thus, if 3 of 5 persons draw black balls, 
the group would choose the black urn.  But if individuals vote seriatim on the urn (and do 
not give the color of the ball they drew), the group can go astray.  If the first two people 
drew red and guessed red, and the others drew black, the group might unanimously 
choose the red urn.  The third person might be swayed by the two preceding guesses and 
guess red as well even though she drew black. The fourth, who also drew black, might 
also guess red, on the grounds that 3 of 4 draws were red. The fifth would presumably 
make the same choice.  This “information cascade” leads the group to choose red without 
dissent. 
  Reviewing the literature on group judgments, Sunstein concludes that “group 
polarization can be heightened, diminished, and possibly even eliminated with seemingly 
small alterations in institutional arrangements” (p 45).  This suggests that whether groups 
behave in a more economically rational way than individuals may depend critically on 
the arrangement and framing of group interactions. 
IV Game Theory and Institutional Design 
   The argument that analyses of efficient bargaining/Coase theorem offer the most 
promising road toward the missing EU social dialogue model directs attention not only at 
empirical analyses of actual bargaining situations but also at theoretical investigations of   22 
bargaining situations by rational (or other) decision-makers and of institutional designs 
that can produce efficient outcomes.  Game theory provides a rich set of models on 
conditions for efficient bargaining and the Coase theorem. The associated 
implementation theory (Jackson, 2001) examines ways to design institutions so that the 
parties reach or approximate efficient equilibrium.  Although researchers in these areas 
have not directed their investigations toward EU social dialogue systems, the work offers 
potentially useful insight toward the “holy grail” social dialogue model.  
  What does the game theory/implementation theory say about bargaining and 
social dialogue activities? 
  First, the analyses show that the institutional structure of a bargaining game 
matters critically as to whether it yields a socially efficient outcome.  Using different 
modelling structures Anderlini and Felli (2001) and Dixit and Olson (2000) find that even 
modest transactions costs for participating in a bargaining or dialogue system can readily 
lead to inefficient equilibrium.
10  Since there are always some transactions costs in any 
negotiation, the implication is that the Coase theorem is non-robust to these costs.  In a 
similar vein Jackson (2001) stresses that particular mechanisms for implementing 
decision-making can have huge effects on strategic behavior and social outcomes.  These 
analyses also highlight a tension between bargaining systems that allow participants to 
reach undesirable equilibrium (giving them an incentive to avoid those decisions) and 
systems in which renegotiation allow participants to escape disaster but which reduce the 
                                                 
10Anderlini and Felli use an alternating offer model of negotiation where the bargainers pay a transactions 
fee at each stage and show that strategic “hold up” conditions can produce situations where the parties 
never come to a profitable agreement.  Dixit and Olson model a public goods game in which free rider 
considerations induce many people to opt out of the bargaining process, which leads to failure to produce 
the good.    23 
disincentive to make  poor decisions in the first place.  
   From one perspective, the dependence of results on institutional detail is 
disappointing, since it suggests that small differences in design can have large effects on 
the success or failure of  social dialogue systems. But this is not a surprising result given 
the dependence of outcomes on the specifics of game structures broadly (Kreps, 1990). 
Optimistically, it suggests that experimentation or tinkering with a system has the 
potential for improving outcomes.  It also suggests that EU policies that require 
bargaining or dialogue may help achieve efficient outcomes.  
  Second, studies that examine the characteristics of bargainers and bargaining 
situations show that homogeneous groups, with similar endowments and abilities, 
operating under stable power relations, are more likely to reach efficient bargains than 
others (Rajan and Zingales (2000)).  Inequality reduces the chance for attaining 
efficiency because it increases the incentive for the poor or less productive to use their 
resources for rent-seeking rather than to contribute to social output.  Stable relations 
increase the chance of reaching efficient bargains because parties can be secure that gains 
from an efficient contract accruing to the other side will not change their relative power 
in the future.  For example, if 80% of an expected gain from an efficiency enhancing 
economic reform goes to business and business can use this gain to campaign for laws 
that may restrict union power in the future, unions may refuse to go along with the 
reform, even though it raises the income of business and workers 
11 
  These considerations suggest that EU countries, particularly the smaller ones, are 
                                                 
11 Taking a different approach, Hirshleifer (1995) stresses the importance of the technology of conflict in 
leading parties to allocate different fractions of their resources to fighting over distribution as opposed to 
producing more output, and shows that under some technologies some resources will always be spent on   24 
reasonably well-suited to reaching socially efficient outcomes through bargaining.  
Income inequality is modest compared to the US.  Populations are relatively 
homogenous. And society, including the business community, accepts the legitimacy of 
labor organizations.  The development of EU wide institutions has, moreover, given an 
additional layer of security to the social partners. 
  Third, analyses show that the ability of participants to make side payments can 
affect outcomes substantially.  Commitment to make compensating transfers raises  the 
chances of attaining the efficient outcome.  In situations where one of the parties loses 
from an agreement, the ability of the winner to commit to the transfer is necessary for the 
agreement. But transfers themselves can be inefficient, reducing the value of the bargain, 
for instance by reducing the incentive of workers and firms in declining industries to shift 
to more productive activities (Dixit and Londregan, 1995).  This appears to be 
agricultural policy in both the US and EU.   
   Surprisingly, however, the side contracting or transfers that lie at the heart of 
efficient bargaining do not always improve efficiency, even in a world of complete 
information and zero transactions cost. Jackson and Wilkie (2005) show that parties can 
use side contracts to manipulate the payoff from bargaining so as to redistribute incomes 
to themselves at the cost of efficiency.  They suggest that side payments work better 
when only one player makes them (for instance where someone pays another party to 
reduce pollution) than in situations where many participants make side payments (say in 
encouraging public goods production).  They also show that side payments are more 
likely to support efficient strategies when three or more players are involved in decision-
                                                                                                                                                 
rent-seeking.    25 
making.  The implication is that tripartite bargaining – capital, labor, and government, 
may be particularly fruitful, at least in some circumstances. The 1987 Irish social pact in 
which unions accepted small wage increases, so that firms had incentives to expand 
production, while the government compensated workers with tax reductions may be a 
case in point.  The Pact and succeeding Irish agreements contributed to Ireland’s recovery 
from economic basket-case in the 1980s to Celtic wonder-economy in the 1990s-2000s.   
  Fourth, information is an important determinant of the likelihood of attaining 
efficient outcomes.  Complete information with each party knowing the other’ situation is 
no guarantee of efficiency, but its absence – private information in which parties know 
only their own benefits/costs – increases the chance of inefficient results.  Bargaining 
over an indivisible item – say greater authority for the firm to set working hours that will 
raise output -- can result in inefficiencies when each agent privately knows their 
valuation but is uncertain about the valuation the other party places on it (Myerson and 
Satterthwaite).  In this case there is an incentive to use private information strategically to 
gain a larger share of  income, which can lead to an agreement that fails to maximize 
joint surplus or to no agreement at all.  Mckelvey and Page (2002) show that the outcome 
in such circumstances will be tilted toward the party who initially has the property rights 
rather than being independent of the initial property rights, per the Coase Theorem. 
  The bottom line of the game theory/implementation theory analyses of bargaining 
is that the way society – government or social partners – design a social dialogue or 
bargaining system is likely to affect economic outcomes.   
V. Conclusion  
  This paper has argued that efficient bargaining/Coase Theorem models offer the   26 
best starting point for analyzing EU social dialogue economies.  Since the evidence 
shows that these models fit the economic world at best loosely, they are most sensibly 
viewed as benchmarks comparable to the perfectly functioning competitive model used to 
benchmark market-driven economies. If the representative agent hypothesis is correct, 
participants in social dialogue systems may be less prone to anomalous decision-making  
than laboratory experiments find for individuals acting on their own behalf.  On the other 
hand, if deviations from rational self-interest favor cooperative behavior, as experimental 
studies indicate, social dialogue systems where decision-makers diverge from economic 
rationality may reach efficiency more readily than game theoretic models suggest.   
  Overall, this review of laboratory and theoretic analyses relevant to understanding 
social dialogue economies suggests the virtue of a research programme that examines 
design factors that lead parties to efficient solutions, not only on the assumption of 
rational strategic behavior but also on potentially more realistic assumptions about how 
people make decisions.  In any case, whatever the true social dialogue theory turns out to 
be, it should help level the playing field in the “war of the models” between the  EU and 
US economies and it should direct attention at ways to improve the efficacy of social 
dialogue institutions  Given Enzio Tarantelli’s comittment to social dialogue as a way for 
Italy to resolve its economic problems in the 1980s, I would guess that were he with us 
today, he would look favorably upon these areas of research and be contributing to them. 
  EU social dialogue model, where art thou?   
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Exhibit 1: The EU and US Economic Systems  
 
 
  US : Invisible Hand  EU : Social Partners 
ECONOMY      
Labor Market: 
Wages 
Market/employer driven  Collective bargaining with extension 
employment   employment at will – 
employers own job 
employment protection legislation – 
workers own job 
company level formal 
dialogue 
Illegal under Section 8a of 
the Labor Management 
Relations Act unless union 
involved; employee 
involvement committees 
European Works Councils (EC 
94/45/EC); different country council 
legislation 
Product Market   less regulated, with ease of 
entry and exit, bankruptcy 
laws favorable to debtors 
greater regulation of business, harder 
entry and exit 
     
GOVERNMENT     
safety nets  limited, short duration of 
unemployment benefits 
high replacement for unemployment 
with long duration, so long spells 
health   health care through 
employer/private purchase 
national health care 
higher education  universities dependent on 
private support, tuition, 
business linked 
publically funded, free universities 
     
 
   
Source: Author’s analysis   28 
Exhibit 2: EU Social Dialogue from workplace to national policy 
 
European Social Dialogue (Social Dialogue Summit, Brussels, Sept 2005) 
European social dialogue is the discussions between employee and employer representative 
organisations (the social partners). These can take the form of consultations, negotiations and 
joint actions undertaken by the social partner organisations.  
At European level, social dialogue takes two main forms - bipartite dialogue between the 
European employers and trade union organisations, and tripartite dialogue involving 
interaction between the social partners and the public authorities.  
These are the essential means by which the social partners help define European social 
standards, and play a vital role in the governance of the Union. European-level social 
dialogue has received strong institutional recognition in the EC Treaty and in the conclusions 
to a number of key European Council meetings, notably those of Laeken and Barcelona. 
Combining the values of responsibility, solidarity and participation, the European social 




  As of mid 2005, the US had nearly 35,000 registered lobbyists for Congress alone.  
Lobbyists in the US target the Senate, the House of Representatives, and state legislatures.  
They may also represent their clients'  or organizations'  interests in dealings with federal, 
state, or local executive branch agencies or the courts. Lobbyists sometimes also write 
legislation.   Since 1998, 43 percent of the 198 members of Congress who left government to 
join private life have registered to lobby.  Former lawmakers are hired as lobbyists because 
of their relationships with their former colleagues as well as other contacts. In 2006, 273 
former members of Congress or heads of federal agency were lobbyists.  
 
Attitudes of Americans toward lobbying:  
     75% believe political lobbyists have too much power, 1994-2001 (Harris) 
     81% believe it is common for lobbyists to bribe members of Congress, 2006 (Pew) 
      91% concerned about corruption in Washington, 2006 (Fox) 
 
Source: EU dialogue,  Europa, European Commission,  
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/05/344&format=HTML
&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en;Knowlton, Brian “Lobbyists’s scandal has a K 
street home” International Herald Tribune, January 11, 2006, www.iht.com 
US  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lobbyist; under lobbying. Harris Poll #23, May 16, 2001, 
table 2,  www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/printerfriend/index.asp?PID=233, 
www.citizen.org/print article.fm?ID=14945 for Pew and Fox polls.    29 
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